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Abstract This study analyses price effects of six mergers in the Dutch healthcare
industry. We investigate whether the merging hospitals raised their prices for hip sur-
gery after the merger and, if so, how patients react to this higher price. For seven of
the twelve hospitals involved, we found a statistically significant price increase for
hip surgery, for three hospitals we found a significant price decrease. There is no clear
relationship between price changes of hip surgery and changes in travelling behaviour
of patients post merger.
Keywords Competition law enforcement · Merger control · Ex-post studies ·
Healthcare
JEL Classification D49 · L40 · L50 · L80
1 Introduction
Mergers of hospitals and the assessment of these mergers by competition authorities
often get a lot of attention by both public and politics. Discussions concentrate on the
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effect of mergers on quality, accessibility, scale inefficiencies and the emergence of
market power. In the ex-ante assessments of these mergers most attention is given to
the geographical market delineation.
In the United States, there were over 900 hospital mergers during the period 1995–
2002. Competition authorities challenged only seven of these cases. In court, they lost
all seven cases, and most of these losses were because of the geographical market
delineation. The courts usually accepted the broad market definition that the parties
put forward. Nevertheless, studies that performed ex-post assessments of hospital
mergers showed that several hospital mergers did have anticompetitive price-effects.
Moreover, in 2005, competition authorities challenged a hospital merger ex-post. In
this case, the court accepted the limited geographical market put forward by the com-
petition authorities. This was the first time since the 1980s that the courts ruled in
favour of the competition authorities with regard to challenging a hospital merger
(Varkevisser and Schut 2009).1
Since the gradual introduction of managed competition in the Dutch hospital mar-
ket in 2004, the NMa has until the end of 2011 assessed twelve hospital mergers. Apart
from an intended merger that was cancelled by the merging parties and two merger
assessments that are still ongoing, the NMa approved all of the other mergers, mainly
because there would be enough competition left on the market after each merger.
Some of these decisions have led to a lively debate among policymakers, scholars,
and politicians.2 The geographical market definition in particular turned out to be one
of the focal points of this debate (Janssen et al. 2009). According to some critics,
the NMa should, in case of doubt, have chosen for the smaller geographical market
instead of for the larger geographical market. Unlike in the U.S., hospital mergers in
the Netherlands have yet to be empirically assessed ex-post.
In this study, we perform an ex-post analysis of six mergers involving Dutch
hospitals that were approved by the NMa: the Ziekenhuis Hilversum—Ziekenhuis
Gooi-Noord merger (hereafter: Tergooiziekenhuizen merger), Erasmus MC—
Havenziekenhuis Rotterdam merger (hereafter: Rotterdam-hospital merger), Medisch
Centrum Alkmaar—Gemini Ziekenhuis merger (hereafter MCA-Gemini merger), St.
Lucas Ziekenhuis—Delfzicht ziekenhuis merger (hereafter Ommelander ziekenhuis
merger), Ziekenhuis Walcheren—Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen merger (hereafter Ad-
miraal De Ruyter ziekenhuis merger) and Ziekenhuis Bethesda—Scheperziekenhuis
merger (hereafter Leveste-Middenveld merger). In particular, the Tergooiziekenhui-
zen merger, the MCA-Gemini merger and the Admiraal De Ruyter merger have led
to much debate and criticism from policymakers, scholars and politicians (see e.g.
Janssen et al. 2009). In our analysis, we investigate whether or not the merging hos-
pitals increased their prices for hip surgery, which can be an indication for parties
using their increased market power. Moreover, we analyze the travelling behaviour
of patients to see whether patients react to a price increase by switching to another
hospital.
1 This case is FTC—Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation, No. 9315 (FTC May 17, 2005).
2 See for example a special issue of the journal Markt & Mededinging, No. 2: April 2009, that was entirely
devoted to competition in the healthcare sector. Other examples are Kalbfleisch (2009), Reering (2009),
Canoy (2008), van Sinderen (2008) and Varkevisser and Schut (2008).
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Section 2 provides an overview of the related literature. In Sect. 3, we describe the
reforms in the Dutch hospital sector and the process of (hospital) merger control in
the Netherlands. The methodology and data are described in Sect. 4. The results are
discussed in Sect. 5, followed by the conclusions in Sect. 6.
2 Literature Overview
The economic literature covers a large number of empirical studies on the effects of
mergers on prices. These studies compare the effect of the outcome of either an anti-
trust intervention or antitrust abstention with the estimated effect of a counterfactual
(Don et al. 2008; Niels and van Dijk 2008).
Several quantitative ex-post studies of mergers in the healthcare sector have been
conducted over the past years. Most of these ex-post evaluations of hospital mergers
originate from the U.S., as competition in the healthcare sector has been introduced
there quite some time ago.3 Until the beginning of the 2000s, most of the studies that
investigated the effects of hospital mergers used the structure-conduct-performance
paradigm. In these studies, the correlation between market concentration and price is
employed to assess a merger. Since the 1990s, the studies typically found a positive
relationship between concentration and price (see e.g. Dranove et al. 1993; Pautler
and Vita 1994), suggesting that hospital mergers would lead to higher prices after the
mergers have gone through. Although quite informative, these studies, however, did
not reveal any direct evidence of the effects of mergers. Furthermore, the results of
these studies depend heavily on the market definition, which in itself is very chal-
lenging (Varkevisser et al. 2008). Consequently, in these studies, inaccurate market
definitions may have led to incorrect conclusions about the effects of mergers.
Since 2000, comparing pre-merger prices with post-merger prices has been the
most common methodology, particularly using the difference-in-differences (DID)
approach. One of the major advantages of this methodology is that it does not require
any market definition. Accordingly, erroneous conclusions about the effect of a merger,
as a consequence of an incorrect market definition, are avoided. Connor et al. (1998)
and Krishnan (2001) used DID approaches to assess multiple hospital mergers ex-post.
Connor et al. analyzed the change in total patient revenue for all of the 122 hospitals in
the U.S. that merged during the period 1986–1994. They found a decrease in costs of
5 % and a price decrease of 5 % for the merging hospitals relative to the control group
of non-merging hospitals. They concluded that the decrease in costs is converted into
lower prices and the mergers have thus been pro-competitive. Krishnan (2001) exam-
ined 22 hospital mergers in Ohio and 15 hospital mergers in California. His analysis
took place at the level of case (treatment) types and he showed that, for all case types
studied, the price increase for the merging hospitals was higher than for the control
group. Moreover, he demonstrated that the price increase was larger for the case types
for which the merging hospital obtained a larger market share. Vita and Sacher (2001)
showed that the merger analyzed led to significant price increases (around 15 and
30 %). They also demonstrated that the change in cost did not provide an explanation
3 See for instance the special issue of the International Journal of Economics and Business, 2011, 18(1).
123
240 R. G. M. Kemp et al.
for the price increases, and that the market share of the merging hospitals in the Santa
Cruz County had declined, indicating that a relative quality improvement could not
explain the price.
Recently, three articles were published in the International Journal of Economics
and Business in which employees of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) studied the
price effects of four hospital mergers that took place in the beginning of the 2000s,
using a DID approach. For one hospital merger, Tenn (2011) compared pre-merger
to post-merger prices to be paid by three large insurers. He used control variables for
observable hospital characteristics, like the type of hospital, the number of beds and
the for-profit status of the hospital. One of the merging hospitals had relatively low
pre-merger prices, while the other hospital had relatively high pre-merger prices. Post
merger, the prices converged to the higher price level. Regression analysis confirmed
that the price change of the hospital with lower prices was significantly larger than the
average price change, while the price change of the hospital with higher prices was
not statistically different from that in the control group. This conclusion held for all
insurers.
Haas-Wilson and Garmon (2011) investigated two hospital mergers. For one merger,
regression analysis showed that for four of the five managed-care organizations
(MCOs), the price increase was large and significant.4 In the other merger, regres-
sion analysis showed a significant relative price decrease due to the merger for three
MCOs, a non-significant relative price increase for one MCO and a significant relative
price increase for another MCO. On average, there was a relative price increase of 4 %
in the period 1999–2002.
The results of the evaluation of a hospital merger by Thompson (2011) were mixed.
Regression analysis demonstrated that two insurers experienced a significant price
increase (> 50 %), one insurer had a significant price decrease (−29 %), whereas
another insurer had a small price increase compared to the control group.
3 Hospital Mergers in the Netherlands
3.1 Introduction
The NMa, established in 1998, enforces fair competition in all sectors of the Dutch
economy. A part of its responsibility is ex-ante assessment of mergers. During the
period of 1998–2003, before the major reforms in the healthcare sector had been
introduced, several hospital mergers were notified at the NMa for assessment. The
conclusion of the subsequent reviews by the NMa was that actual competition between
hospitals was not yet possible due to price and supply regulation (NMa 2004; Varke-
visser et al. 2008) and therefore, such mergers could not restrict competition. The NMa
therefore decided to approve these hospital mergers without carrying out substantive
assessments.
4 A MCO is a health organization that finances and delivers health care using a specific provider network
and specific services and products.
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Table 1 Merging hospitals in the Netherlands (till 31/12/2011)
Merging hospitals Date Decision
Juliana Kinderziekenhuis/RKZ-Leyenburg 28-1-2004 No license required
Ziekenhuis Hilversum—Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord 15-12-2004 License is required
(Tergooiziekenhuizen) 8-6-2005 License issued
Erasmus MC—Havenziekenhuis Rotterdam 8-6-2005 No license required
Ziekenhuis Walcheren—Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen 18-11-2005 License is required
(Admiraal De Ruyter Ziekenhuis) 16-8-2006 Withdrawn
8-8-2008 License is required
25-3-2009 License issued, with remedies
Laurentius Ziekenhuis—St. Jans Gasthuis 19-2-2007 No license required, merger is not
implemented
Vlietland Ziekenhuis—MC Rijnmond Zuid 19-7-2007 No license required, merger is not
implemented
MC Alkmaar—Gemini Ziekenhuis 13-9-2007 No license required
St. Lucas Ziekenhuis—Delfzicht Ziekenhuis
(Ommelander Ziekenhuis)
29-4-2008 No license required
Ziekenhuis Bethesda—Scheperziekenhuis
(Leveste—Middenveld merger)
21-8-2009 No license required
Zorggroep Noorderbreedte—Ziekenhuis De
Tjongerschans
6-9-2010 License is required
28-9-2011 License issued
Orbis Medisch Centrum—Atrium Medisch Centrum
Parkstad
5-9-2011 License is required, assessment
process is ongoing
TweeSteden Ziekenhuis—St. Elisabeth Ziekenhuis 20-12-2011 License is required, assessment
process is ongoing
However, in 2004, the NMa concluded that, given the legislation at that time, hos-
pitals could compete with respect to quality, service and supply. In addition, after the
introduction of the competitive segment in 2005, competition also became possible
with respect to price. From then onwards, the NMa has assessed hospital mergers for
their effect on competition. The NMa has assessed ten hospital mergers since 2004,
two merger are currently being assessed, see Table 1. In most cases, the merging hos-
pitals were close competitors in a geographical sense. Except for the Admiraal De
Ruyter ziekenhuis merger, the NMa approved all hospital mergers unconditionally
(or is still in the assessment process), primarily because of the fact that there would
be enough competition left on the market after the merger. The Admiraal De Ruyter
merger was approved conditional on behavioural commitments. The commitments
concern amongst others a price cap in which the prices in the competitive part are not
allowed to increase more than the national average price increase. Two of the approved
mergers (Laurentius Ziekenhuis—St. Jans Gasthuis and Vlietland Ziekenhuis—MC
Rijnmond Zuid) were not implemented by the merging parties, the hospitals remain
independent.
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3.2 Reforms in the Dutch Healthcare System
In this section, we describe the institutional framework of the Dutch healthcare sector,
since it is important to take this into account when performing ex-ante and ex-post
assessments of hospital mergers.
Over the last 5 years, a number of major reforms took place in the Dutch healthcare
sector. The policy objectives of the Dutch government are to keep healthcare afford-
able, accessible and of high quality. This is done by a gradual introduction of a system
of managed competition.
With regard to hospitals, the first steps were the introduction of a system of so-called
diagnosis-treatment combinations (DBCs), as well as the introduction of a competi-
tive segment of hospital care. A DBC describes the care for a patient in four codes:
care requirement, care type, diagnosis and treatment. In this way, a DBC covers the
entire treatment process a patient goes through, from the first appointment to the last
check. The DBC diagnosis codes are connected to the international ICD10-codes.
The DBC system was introduced in 2005, and it forms a unequivocal negotiation and
declaration language: DBCs are the same in all Dutch hospitals and can be seen as
relatively homogeneous treatments. For a carefully selected small group of DBCs,
namely DBCs that deal with uncomplicated, elective (non-acute) outpatient hospital
care, prices, quantities and quality were made subject to bargaining between insurers
and hospitals. This competitive segment of hospital care is called the B-segment. All
other treatments are part of the non-competitive segment (A-segment). For each treat-
ment in the B-segment, insurers negotiate on the price with hospitals. In 2005, 8 % of
the hospital care was part of the competitive segment. The competitive segment was
expanded by including more treatments to 20 % of the hospital care in 2008, to 34 %
in 2009 (NZa 2008) and to 70 % in 2012.
In 2006, the Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa, previously College Tarieven Gez-
ondheidszorg/ZAio) was established, which is the sector-specific regulator for all
healthcare markets in the Netherlands. The NZa promotes quality, accessibility and
affordability in the healthcare sector and can provide the NMa with opinions in hospital
merger cases with respect to these three aspects of health care.
Since January 1st, 2006, the new Health Insurance Act has been in effect, legally
requiring all residents of the Netherlands to take out healthcare insurance and to get
at least a basic health insurance package. This package consists of basic medical and
hospital care. The coverage of this package is the same for each resident, although
the fee may differ per insurer. Healthcare insurers are obliged to accept all applicants
for the basic package, and they have to charge the same price to each insured per-
son. As a result, price discrimination and risk selection are not allowed regarding the
basic package. To compensate insurance companies for actuarially predictable health
expenditure differentials induced by socio-demographic factors, such as age, sex,
income, location and prior health care consumption (chronic pharmaceutical depen-
dencies and prior hospitalization), a sophisticated risk adjustment system has been
introduced. This risk adjustment system was meant to level the playing field for health
insurers and, as a consequence, to enable price competition (see Schut and van de Ven
2005).
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4 Methodology
4.1 Model
To study the ex-post price effect of the hospital mergers, we use the difference-in-
differences (DID) approach, which is based on a ‘before-after’ comparison (Hunter
et al. 2008). This method is also used in previous studies on the price effect of hospi-
tal mergers (see e.g. Tenn 2011; Thompson 2011). We include all other hospitals in
the Netherlands in the regression, in which the price is affected by the same factors,
but not by the merger. In order to distinguish the effect of the mergers, it is neces-
sary to control for factors (so called observable characteristics) that can cause a price
change, such as the number of specialists and the competition conditions. Other fac-
tors which are more difficult to quantify, like technological developments and changes
in the regulatory framework are also controlled for in the DID approach. We assume
that the merging hospitals are influenced by general technological developments and
regulatory reforms to the same degree as the other hospitals in the Netherlands are.
Typically, ex-post merger studies use a model of the form (Tenn 2011: 71):
ln p j = X jβ + γh j + αPost Merger j + θ(Post Merger j ∗ m j ) + ω j (1)
The dependent variable p j is the price for patient j , X j represents the set of patient
characteristics and γh j is the fixed effect for hospital h. The variable Post Merger j
is a dummy variable that has value one if a patient enters a hospital in the post merger
period. Dummy variable m j is equal to one if the hospital is one of the merging hos-
pitals. The coefficient θ is the DID parameter and reflects the difference between the
price change of the merging hospitals and the price change of the control group, after
controlling for the observable characteristics (X j ).
Tenn (2011) and Thompson (2011) use a two-step approach to avoid downward-
biased standard errors (Bertrand et al. 2004). In the first stage, the average price change
for each hospital is estimated, while controlling for patient characteristics. In the sec-
ond stage, the difference between the price change of the merging hospitals and the
price change of the control group of hospitals is estimated, controlling for hospital
characteristics that explain variation in each hospital’s post merger price change. In
our analysis, we can aggregate the patients’ level data to insurer-hospital level data
without a loss of information as the prices are the same for all patients that have the
same insurer and that enter the same hospital. Therefore, it is not necessary to control
for patient characteristics, as our level of analysis is the hospital-insurer level and
patient characteristics do not affect DBC-prices.5
We determine the price effect of the merger by performing a fixed effect panel
regression. We control for hospital characteristics that are not constant over time like
the number of specialists and quality. Furthermore, we include time dummies to control
5 In contrast, Tenn (2011) and Thompson (2011) need to control for patient characteristics, like age, sex
and type of insurance. This is due to the differences between the American health insurance system and
the Dutch system. We have also employed an analysis in which we corrected the actual prices for patient
characteristics (age and sex), the results have the same magnitude as the results reported in this paper.
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Table 2 Control variables for observable hospital characteristics
Control variable Description
HHI insurersa Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of insurers, per province
Medical specialists Number of medical specialists working in the hospital
Orthopedists Number of orthopedists working in the hospital
Outpatient cases Relative number of outpatient cases in the hospital
Quality ADb Score on yearly Algemeen Dagblad (AD, a Dutch
newspaper) survey on hospital quality
a This information is obtained from Monitor Zorgverzekeringsmarkt 2008, by NZa
b This information is obtained from Algemeen Dagblad, AD Ziekenhuis Top 100 (http://www.ad.nl/
ziekenhuistop100)
for time fixed effects and control for unobservable hospital characteristics by means
of including a control group.6 The unit of analysis is the hospital-insurer combination.
So we estimate a model of the form:
ln phit = α + z′htβ +
mh∑
j=1
(θh,t+ j Mergerh,t+ j ) + ξt + ηhi +εhit
t = 2005, . . ., 2010 (2)
where ln phit is the price per hospital h and insurer i combination in year t , α is the
constant, z′ht reflects the observable hospital characteristics in year t (see Table 2). The
coefficient θh,t+ j is the DID parameter, reflecting the price effect separate for each
merging hospital, for each year after the merger approval. Mergerh is a dummy var-
iable that is equal to one for the post merger year(s) and zero otherwise, ξt represents
the time fixed effect parameter and ηhi is the hospital-insurer fixed effect parameter.
The analysis is done for hip surgery in the competitive segment, and for one specific
disorder in particular, i.e. the abrasion of the hip, arthrosis. This is a disorder that is
very common among seniors and is a fairly homogeneous treatment. The treatment
includes more than 95 % of total hip treatments in the 2005 competitive segment. We
concentrate on this treatment because hip treatments constituted a large share of the
total revenue in the 2005 competitive segment of hospital care in the Netherlands
(20 % in 2005).7 Furthermore, hip surgery is performed in almost all hospitals in the
Netherlands, so a large control group can be constructed. Finally, hip surgery is typ-
ically performed in hospitals and not in independent treatment centres.8 Analysis for
the whole competitive segment is difficult as the competitive segment is expanded
6 Moreover, our control group is relatively large, so we do not have the problem that the obtained estimates
are imprecise as a consequence of a small control group (see e.g. Tenn 2011, p. 72).
7 See Monitor Ziekenhuiszorg 2004, Monitor Ziekenhuiszorg 2005, Monitor Ziekenhuiszorg 2006, Mon-
itor Ziekenhuiszorg 2007, by NZa.
8 Independent treatment centers are small outpatient treatment centers that are allowed to enter the market
since 1998. These independent treatment centers are only allowed to provide elective (no acute) hospital
care (Halbersma et al. 2007).
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over time and there are some changes in the content of some DBC treatments making
price comparison over time impossible.
4.2 Data
The analysis is based on a NZa dataset of treatment, prices, quantities and patient
characteristics for all hospitals in the Netherlands. The level of analysis is the hospi-
tal-insurer combination level. We have data for the period 2005–2010. This implies
that the price effect of two approved mergers [Juliana Kinderziekenhuis—RKZ Leyen-
burg (2004) and Zorggroep Noorderbreedte—Ziekenhuis De Tjongerschans (2011)]
cannot be included in the analysis. Furthermore, two approved mergers Laurentius
Ziekenhuis—St. Jans Gasthuis and Vlietland Ziekenhuis—MC Rijnmond Zuid were
not implemented by the merging parties. Therefore, we test the price effect of six
mergers which were approved in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2009.
The control group consists of all other hospitals in the Netherlands that perform hip
surgery in the period 2005–2010. In total, we have 4,851 observations. We control for
observable differences between the hospitals by including several control variables
(see Table 2).9 Most variables have been obtained from the NZa unless otherwise
stated.
The number of medical specialists indicates the size of the hospitals and to what
extent they have grown during this period.10 The relative number of outpatient cases
and the number of orthopedists control for the focus and expertise of the hospital
with respect to the competitive segment in general and to hip surgery in particular.
Outpatient cases shows to what extent hospitals focus on the competitive segment,
relative to the non-competitive segment during this period.11 Orthopedics is the med-
ical specialism that deals with hip surgery. An increase of the number of orthopedists
may imply, for example, lower price increases (economies of scale), or higher price
increases (more expertise and higher quality). The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index insur-
ers (HHI)12 control for the competition and negotiation circumstances. A larger HHI
of the insurers indicates a stronger bargaining power which can lead to lower price
increases. Finally, we control for overall quality at hospital level (Quality AD), as
there is no specific and reliable quality measure for hip surgery available. An relative
increase in quality may lead to relatively higher prices, while decreased quality may
lead to relatively lower prices. Quality is measured by the score in the annual survey
of Dutch newspaper Algemeen Dagblad (AD) on quality, which consists of twenty-six
9 We wanted to include the length of the waiting lists as a control variable as well, but this was not possible
due to a lack of reliable information.
10 The number of beds may also indicate to what extent the size of hospitals matters, but this measure
only takes into account inpatient cases. Conversely, a change in the number of medical specialists takes into
account both inpatient and outpatient cases. Moreover, the number of beds of the hospitals has virtually
been constant during the period of our investigation.
11 The major part of the treatments in the competitive segment is outpatient cases.
12 To calculate the HHI, we need to determine the relevant geographical market. For the HHI insurers, we
define the market as province. The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of the
insurers per province.
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Table 3 Price index (hip surgery) of merging hospitals, pre and post merger (national, excluding merging
parties = 100)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
National (excluding merging hospitals) 100.0 100.7 101.7 104.2 104.3 104.5
Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord (2005) 101.3 103.2 104.6 106.7 107.7 111.7
Ziekenhuis Hilversum (2005) 97.4 102.7 104.6 106.7 107.7 111.7
Havenziekenhuis Rotterdam (2005) 104.0 113.0 106.2 105.7 105.9 104.3
Erasmus MC (2005) 104.7 101.5 103.8 111.8 111.3 115.3
MC Alkmaar (2007) 96.3 101.4 102.9 98.8 121.7 106.9
Gemini Ziekenhuis (2007) 111.0 112.4 102.3 123.0 140.0 123.7
Delfzicht Ziekenhuis (2008) 96.0 98.8 100.9 100.9 104.6 103.6
St. Lucas Ziekenhuis (2008) 99.0 107.2 105.6 101.7 104.6 103.6
Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen (2009) 102.2 99.7 100.3 101.8 104.6 102.8
Ziekenhuis Walcheren (2009) 104.2 99.3 99.4 106.2 103.6 102.8
Ziekenhuis Bethesda (2009) 89.3 96.4 97.8 99.8 99.2
Scheperziekenhuis (2009) 98.9 100.9 102.9 104.0 116.3 106.8
quality indicators that are formulated by, amongst others, the Netherlands Health Care
Inspectorate (IGZ). Examples of these quality indicators are undernourishment, pain
after surgery, cancelled operations and patient satisfaction.
5 Results
5.1 Price Development
Table 3 shows the average price increase for hip surgery in the whole industry (exclud-
ing the merging hospitals, 2005 = 100) as well as for the merging hospitals individually.
Nationwide, there is a price increase of 4.5 % over the 6 years studied. After the
merger, Tergooiziekenhuizen, Ommelander Ziekenhuis and Admiraal De Ruyter Zie-
kenhuis have one price for the different locations, whereas Erasmus MC, Haven-
ziekenhuis Rotterdam, MC Alkmaar, Gemini Ziekenhuis, Ziekenhuis Bethesda and
Scheperziekenhuis13 use different prices per location.
We have estimated Eq. 2 via a fixed-effect panel analysis (see Table 4). This results
in an unweighted price effect. Ideally, the results should be weighted by the number of
patients. In a panel setting weighing is, however, difficult; it is not clear which year to
use as basis for the weighing scheme and weighing in panel regressions is not included
in standard statistical software. We did some robustness checks such as an analysis of
the average price effect on the hospital level. The conclusions remain the same except
for St. Lucas Ziekenhuis (no significant effect), Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen (signifi-
cant negative effect) and Scheperziekenhuis (no significant effect). We also performed
13 They will formally merge in January 2012. As we only have post merger data for 2010, we do not know
whether they have one uniform or different prices per location for 2012 onwards.
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regression without the hospital characteristics. The conclusions are the same although
the coefficients change slightly. For the Tergooiziekenhuizen, Rotterdam-hospital and
MCA-Gemini merger, the positive coefficients become more positive, the negative
coefficients less negative. For the Ommelander, Admiraal De Ruyter and the Leveste-
Middenveld merger the opposite holds, the positive coefficients become less positive
and the negative coefficients more negative.
Of the control variables, Outpatients and HHI insurers are significant, the other
control variables are not significant. In the top panel of Table 4, we present the price
effect of the merger per post-merger year. This is the price effect compared to the
base year(s) and can be interpreted as the price change above/below the national price
development.14 For instance, for Delfzicht Ziekenhuis, the price effect of the merger
in 2009 compared to the average price over the pre-merger years 2005–2008 is an
increase of 5.7 %. In the bottom panel, the price effect is presented for the pre-merger
years and the post merger years. For Delfzicht Ziekenhuis this is the price effect of
the merger over the years 2009 and 2010 compared to the average price over the
pre-merger years 2005–2008.
The year-effect dummies for Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord and Ziekenhuis Hilversum
all are significant and positive. The regression analysis shows that, even if we control
for other factors that may cause a price increase, price increases on average by 3.4 %
for Ziekenhuis Gooi-Noord and 4.6 % for Ziekenhuis Hilversum. This price increase
is related to the merger.
The year-effect dummies for the Havenziekenhuis Rotterdam and the Erasmus MC
are sometimes significant, sometimes not, and are positive as well as negative. In the
longer term, the Havenziekenhuis Rotterdam has a negative price effect of 2.6 %. For
Erasmus MC we see significant positive and negative price effects. The average price
effect of 1.2 % over the years is, however, not significant.
All price effects of the MC Alkmaar—Gemini merger are significant and positive
but for one. The first year after the approval of the merger by the NMa, MC Alkmaar
shows a negative price effect. As the merger is approved in September 2007, it is not
clear whether the merger influenced the price negotiations for the year 2008 already.
On average, including 2008, the price in MC Alkmaar increased after the merger by
3.5 % more than the national average. The price effects for Gemini Ziekenhuis are
even larger, on average 16.4 % with a top of 23.5 % in 2009.
For the Ommelander merger, there is an average price increase after the merger of
6.6 % for the Delfzicht Ziekenhuis and 2.3 % for St. Lucas Ziekenhuis.
For the Admiraal De Ruyter merger, we have only one post-merger price. As the
merger is approved in March 2009, we expect that the merger had an effect on the
negotiated prices for 2010. We see a small but insignificant price decrease of 1.0 %
for the Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen and a significant price decrease of 2.0 % for Zie-
kenhuis Walcheren. This is in line with the price cap commitment that the prices are
not allowed to increase more than the national average.
Finally, for the Leveste-Middenveld merger, we have two prices. As the merger
was approved by the NMa in August 2009, it is not clear whether the 2010 prices
14 The first year after the merger decision may be interpreted as a transition year as the prices for year
t + 1 are negotiated in year t .
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are already influenced by the merger. For sake of completeness, we present the prices;
Ziekenhuis Bethesda has a price effect of −0.1 % and Scheperziekenhuis a price effect
of −4.2 %.
5.2 Possible Explanations for the Price Effect
For six of the twelve hospitals involved, we observe a significant average price increase
after the consummated merger ranging form 2.3 to 16.4 %. For only three merging
hospitals, we see a significant price decrease. In this section, we will discuss possible
explanations for these findings.
First of all, the price increases could be the result of an increase in market power.
In economic theory, firms set their price to their cost plus a markup that is related to
their market power. If two competing companies merge, the competitive constraints
that the merging companies exercise on each other will disappear. As a result, the
market power of both companies will increase, which result in a higher markup. If
this is the case, it is an anti-competitive merger. However, a merger can also result in
more efficient operations, i.e. a pro-competitive merger. In that case, the price after the
merger remains the same or decreases even (this could be an explanation for the price
decrease for Havenziekenhuis and Scheperziekenhuis). If the observed price increases
in the six cases is the result of an increase in market power, the competition authority
has made a Type II error (approval of an anticompetitive merger). The extent to which
(an increase in) market power can be used depends, amongst others, on the willing-
ness of patients to switch to other suppliers. Although patients are not price sensitive
because they do not have to pay the price directly (and often do not even observe the
price), we would expect to find an effect of the price increase on patient choices as a
consequence of channelling of patients by insurers. The insurers have to pay the price
and have therefore an incentive to channel patients to relatively cheaper hospitals. We
know that selective contracting by the insurers companies and channelling of their
patients was not used and/or successful between 2005 and 2010. At the moment some
channelling is introduced but it remains to be seen what the effect on patients choices
will be. Apparently, the mechanism suggested above didn’t work effectively in the
period 2005–2010.
A relative price increase may also (partially) be caused by a relative increase in
quality (Argue 2009). Merging parties often claim that one of the reasons to merge
is to increase the quality of care. If quality increases, the price may increase as well.
If the price/quality ratio is lower or remains the same after the merger, the merger
may not be anti-competitive. Given constraints of the data (no good measures for the
quality of hip surgery), we cannot test to what extent an increase in quality is (par-
tially) the cause of the observed price increase. However, there are some indications
that quality cannot explain the (total) price increase. First of all, the overall indica-
tor of quality, the AD score, is not significant. Second, a recent study by Romano
and Balan (2011) on quality improvements in the Evaston merger, in which Haas-
Wilson and Garmon (2011) found significant price increases after the merger, do not
confirm the merging hospitals claim that quality was improved, i.e. the quality effect
after the merger was not significant. Mutter et al. (2011) analyzed multiple hospital
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consolidations during the late 1990s and early 2000 using a similar method and con-
cluded that consolidations had no consistent effect on quality. They found both sig-
nificant quality improvements and quality reductions, depending on the hospital and
quality measure used. In their study, Vita and Sacher (2001) argued that some kind
of volume-related quality increases could exist due to the fact that treatments are per-
formed more frequently at the merging hospitals. However, one would expect no price
increase from this type of quality increase. Alternatively, there may also be quality
improvements due to extra investments or larger resources expenditures (e.g. better but
more expensive prosthesis) per patient after the mergers. This type of quality improve-
ment would results in higher cost after the merger. However, Vita and Sacher found
no significant increase in the expenses per patient. So they concluded that quality
improvements did not fully account for the observed price increases after the merger
in their study.
As direct measures of quality are not present, we can look at indirect effects of pos-
sible quality changes. For instance, patients do travel for improved quality. Sonneveld
and Heida (2011) find for hip surgery that for a standard deviation decrease in the AD
score (7.3 points), 3.3 % of the patients bypass the nearest hospital. Thus, if the price
increase is related to a quality improvement, one can expect the average travelling time
of the treated patients to increase. For testing this proposition, we have calculated the
average travel time of patients15 that have undergone hip surgery in one of the merging
hospitals (see Table 5).16 The change in absolute terms is relatively small, i.e. most of
the times less than 5 min. In relative terms, the change is more relevant, from −12 to
23 %.
For the hospitals with a price increase, we see mixed results. For three hospitals,
we see an increase in the average travelling time post merger and for the other three
hospitals we see a decrease in the average travelling time. For each merger, one merg-
ing hospital has an increased and the other a decreased average travelling time post
merger.
Besides the travelling time, also a change in quantities can say something about a
change in quality. Vita and Sacher (2001) argued that:
“ … If the transaction improved the quality of hospital care provided in Santa
Cruz County, relative to that provided in hospitals outside the county, we would
expect to observe (ceteris paribus) an increase in the proportion of Santa Cruz
County residents who seek hospital care within Santa Cruz County. …” (p. 81).
15 For the calculation, we deleted patients with a travelling time longer than 2 h.
16 In the NZa database, the patients are administered to a central administration code of the hospital. After
the merger, three hospitals got a new central administration code (Tergooiziekenhuis, Ommelander zie-
kenhuis and Admiraal De Ruyter ziekenhuis), the other three keep their old separate code. For the first
three mergers, it is not possible to see at which location of the merging hospitals the patient is treated. For
the Tergooiziekenhuis and Ommelander ziekenhuis, we assume that the patient is treated at his/her nearest
location of the merged hospital. This is a lower bound. For the Admiraal De Ruyter ziekenhuis, hip surgeries
are primarily performed in location Ziekenhuis Walcheren, except when complications during surgery are
expected. In that latter case patients are treated in location Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen. Since the majority
of the patient is treated in location Walcheren, we present the average travelling time assuming that all
patient are treated in location Walcheren. If we use the minimum traveling time assumption, the travelling
time of Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen is 19.75 and of Ziekenhuis Walcheren 13.94 min.
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Table 5 Average travel time to
hospitals (in minutes) for hip
surgery pre- and post-merger
Hospital Pre-merger Post-merger
Ziekehuis Gooi-Noord 15.31 16.29
Ziekenhuis Hilversum 14.56 13.23
Havenziekenhuis 14.35 15.19
Erasmus MC 22.87 26.20
MC Alkmaar 18.64 19.95
Gemini Ziekenhuis 24.96 24.31
Delfzicht Ziekenhuis 19.01 16.67
St. Lucas Ziekenhuis 14.22 17.46
Oosterscheldeziekenhuizen 20.27
Ziekenhuis Walcheren 14.48 24.05
Ziekenhuis Bethesda 22.30 19.83
Scheperziekenhuis 17.28 18.12
Table 6 Average market shares
(%) for hip surgery pre- and
post-merger
For the three hospitals with a
new central administration code
(Tergooiziekenhuis,
Ommelander ziekenhuis and
Admiraal De Ruyter ziekenhuis),
we present the combined pre-
and post merger market shares
Hospital Pre-merger Post-merger
Tergooiziekenhuizen 2.81 2.19
Havenziekenhuis 0.66 0.67
Erasmus MC 0.48 0.38
MC Alkmaar 1.47 2.45
Gemini Ziekenhuis 0.80 0.81
Ommelander Ziekenhuis 1.27 0.90
Admiraal De Ruyter ziekenhuis 1.80 1.55
Ziekenhuis Bethesda 0.32 0.29
Scheperziekenhuis 1.09 0.86
We have calculated the market shares of the merged hospitals in the national market.
If the price increase is associated with an increase in quality, one expects to see a
larger market share. For the Tergooiziekenhuizen and the Ommelander Ziekenhuis
this is not the case: the market share decreases. For MC Alkmaar, we see a large
increase in market share, which might indicate an increase in quality, whereas for
Gemini Ziekenhuis, the increase is very small (
 market share = 0.01) which is in no
relation with the average price increase of 16.4 % (Table 6).
A third explanation for the higher prices can be higher costs after the merger as a
result of scale diseconomies, for instance caused by increased bureaucracy. Blank
et al. (2011) found empirical evidence that when the hospital production in the
Netherlands increases by 1 %, the costs increases by 1.23 % and claim, since they
have scale diseconomies, the increasing scale of hospitals can only be explained by an
incentive to create market power as a result of their scale. If this is the reason for the
price increases, the mergers are inefficient. Normally, such a result is not prevented by
the merger control rules but primarily a risk for the merging parties. However, because
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of the impact of inefficient mergers in healthcare on public interest, the Dutch gov-
ernment will introduce additional requirements for healthcare mergers which intend
to prevent such outcomes.17
A fourth explanation could be that the prices of the merging hospitals were below
the national average in the year of the merger approval. This especially holds for the
mergers in 2005, the year of the introduction of the competitive B-segment. For some
hospitals, it took a few years after the opening of the market before the negotiators
were used to the bargaining process for this competitive segment. Price increases can
accordingly indicate improved negotiation skills, i.e. a kind of a learning effect. How-
ever, several price increasing hospitals have a pre-merger price above the national
average, so this argument does not hold for them. Furthermore, for the mergers of
2007 onwards this effect should not be that relevant anymore.
Finally, the price effect may also be influenced by characteristics of the negotiation
process. In most cases, hospitals and insurers do not negotiate on prices of individual
treatments but for a whole package of treatments. If this is the case, the price increases
may be caused by merely administrative choices (lower prices for hip surgery due
to administrative choices before the merger and higher prices for hip surgery after
the merger). However, the national average price for hip surgery closely follows the
average price development of the whole 2005 B-segment package (except for 2010).
6 Final Remarks
6.1 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed the (yearly) effect of six hospital mergers in the Neth-
erlands on the prices for hip surgery. For six of the twelve involved hospitals, we
observed a significant average price increase after the consummated merger, ranging
form 2.3 to 16.4 %. For only three hospitals we see a significant price decrease, of
which one hospital is ‘regulated’ by imposed commitments. Several explanations can
be adduced for these price increases such as an increase in market power, a relative
improvement of quality, increased costs, improved negotiation skills and administra-
tive choices in allocating the total budget. A central point in the NMa decisions is
the expectation that patients would travel if competition parameters change. However,
patient flows seems not to be influenced by the price increases as we have found no
clear relationship between the price change for hip surgery and the travelling behav-
iour of the hip surgery patients. It seems that patients did not react to the price increase
by choosing another hospital and that they are not (effectively) channelled by their
insurers either. As a result, some merging hospitals have increased their price and
insurers are faced by an overall price increase for hip surgery. Only in a few cases, the
merger results in a lower price.
In the MC Alkmaar—Gemini Ziekenhuis merger, the NMa assumed that a merged
hospital will use one price for each location, i.e. they will not price discriminate on
17 See Brief van de Minister en Staatssecretaris van Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport van 14 juni 2011,
Tweede Kamer de Staten Generaal, vergaderjaar 2010–2011, Kamerstukken 32620, Nr 15.
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hospital location. This assumption proved to be incorrect for hip surgery as both loca-
tions continue to charge different prices for hip surgery. Also in the Rotterdam-merger
there are separate prices for hip surgery, although this might be explained by the dif-
ference in the type of hospitals (academic vs. a general hospital).
Furthermore, different insurers do pay different prices for hip surgery per hospi-
tal and are faced with different price effects as a result of the merger. Sometimes a
larger insurer pays a relatively lower price as a competing smaller insurer. However, the
opposite also occurs. Thus, there is no clear pattern how the different insurers are influ-
enced by the mergers. It is therefore important to take all insurers into account when
assessing the mergers. Also more knowledge on the negotiation processes between
the hospitals and insurers is necessary to understand the dynamics that exist after the
merger.
Nowadays, most insurers have contracts with almost all hospitals in the Netherlands.
Moreover, most patients can choose any hospital they want, as insurers virtually do
not channel patients to hospitals that they prefer out of price or quality motives. In
theory, the possibility alone to channel patients will give insurers more bargaining
power in their negotiations with the hospitals. However, it can only work if the threat
of channelling is credible. The observed price increases for hip surgery indicate that
the threat has not been credible so far. At the moment, there are signs that selective
contracting and channelling will take place in the future although certain plans have
been cancelled as well. According to a survey of the NZa, 52 % of healthcare insurers
indicated that they have paid ‘much more’ or ‘more’ attention to channelling in 2009,
relative to the year before (NZa 2009). On the other hand, channelling could be at the
expense of consumer freedom of choice. Therefore, consumers who are channelled
should be compensated in terms of, for instance, shorter waiting lists, a lower insurance
premium or a higher quality.
6.2 Future Research
Just like the results of some recent studies of the FTC, this study shows that in some
cases there is a substantial post-merger price increase. It is, however, important to be
aware of the limitations of this study and be careful when drawing conclusions.
First of all, a relative price increase may (partially) be caused by a relative quality
increase (Argue 2009). In the analysis, we controlled for the overall quality level of
hospitals (not significant). However, we have no specific quality measure for the hip
surgery. Potential indirect quality indicators (average travelling time and market share)
do not give indications that there are significant quality changes related to the merger
(except for MC Alkmaar). To properly assess the contribution of a change in quality
to the price increase, future research should focus on better and more specific quality
indicators. Currently, there are a number of attempts to foster the diffusion of infor-
mation on quality, and especially on the quality of specific treatments.18 Moreover,
the Netherlands Health Care Inspectorate has started a project, called Zichtbare Zorg,
18 Examples are http://www.kiesbeter.nl, http://www.independer.nl and http://rivm.openrepository.com/
rivm/bitstream/10029/16490/1/260101003.pdf (for hip surgery).
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which, within a couple of years, should lead to a uniform set of quality indicators
that is useful for patients. For hospitals, quality can become an additional competition
parameter. Future research is encouraged to include these new quality indicators in
new ex-post studies on price effects as well as studies on the impact of mergers on the
quality of care.
Second, we have focused on only one type of surgery: we did not take into account
all other treatments in the competitive segment. Investigating the price change of all
treatments in the competitive segment may well provide a different picture. It is, for
example, quite common that insurers and hospitals agree on a total budget that hos-
pitals receive annually. Within this budget, the funds that are allocated to specific
treatments can be somewhat arbitrary: for some treatments, a relatively high price can
be agreed on, while for other treatments, a relatively low price can be agreed on.
Third, as there are administrative delays in declarations and uncertainty over the
moment of implementation of the merger, especially the results of the 2009 mergers
should be interpreted with care. This especially hold through for the Leveste-Midd-
enveld merger which was approved in August 2009. It is not clear whether this prices
of 2010 are already influenced by the approval of the merger.
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